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Integration is held to be a key feature of conscious
awareness. Some even argue that the latter cannot occur
without the former. We tested this claim by presenting
masked scenes depicting a person performing an action
with a congruent or an incongruent object (e.g., a man
pouring coffee into a mug or into a roll of toilet paper).
The masked scenes were then followed by briefly flashed
targets that again included a congruent or an
incongruent object, and subjects were asked to judge
targets’ congruency as fast as possible. Reaction times
(RTs) for targets preceded by perceptually invisible
scenes that included an incongruent object were longer
than RTs for targets that were preceded by congruent
images. This implicit measure suggests that subjects
processed certain relations between the object and its
background—or at least between the object and another
object in the scene—despite being unaware of either.
Subjective and objective measures confirmed the
invisibility of the masked scenes, ruling out partial
awareness. These results suggest that incongruency
between scene elements can be unconsciously
processed even at impoverished presentation
conditions, with reduced contrast and exposure
durations as short as 33 ms. They provide evidence for
ongoing contextual influences of unseen stimuli on the
processing of a subsequent target.
Introduction
At every waking moment, we experience the external
world in a uniﬁed manner. In what seems to be an
effortless, natural process, we continuously integrate
numerous types of information from various modalities
into a coherent percept: our home, a street, the beach.
Such complex integration of information—here, dif-
ferent objects and background into a single, visual
scene—is considered by many to be the hallmark of
conscious awareness (see, e.g., Baars, 2005; Dehaene &
Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2006; Lamme & Roelfsema,
2000; and most prominently, Tononi, 2013; Tononi &
Edelman, 1998; Tononi & Koch, 2008). Most theories
of consciousness hold unconscious processes to run in
parallel, operating in encapsulated modules with few
interactions with other processing units, while con-
scious processes are claimed to inherently involve long-
range interactions between distinct brain regions (see,
e.g., Crick & Koch, 2003; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001)
through recurrent loops and feedback projections
(Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). These enable the rapid
integration of signals from a variety of modalities and
submodalities that is required for establishing speciﬁc
relationships ﬁrst between features (Treisman & Ge-
lade, 1980) and then between individual items, until a
structured mental representation is formed (Engel,
Fries, Konig, Brecht, & Singer, 1999; Goodale, 2004).
Thus, irreducibility—that is, the integration of infor-
mation contained above and beyond that possessed by
its individual parts—is considered the key property of
consciousness (Tononi, 2004).
Koch and Tononi (2011) have suggested how this
property could be tested within the restricted domain of
stationary visual scenes using operational tests for
visual-scene consciousness. Building upon the assump-
tion that consciousness is necessary for integrative
processes, they reasoned that any system that showed
integrative capacities should be considered as con-
scious. In fact, according to the integrated-information
theory (Tononi, 2004, 2013), the higher the level of
consciousness a system has, the higher is its ability to
produce integrated information. Accordingly, and
reminiscent of the traditional Turing test for machine
intelligence (Turing, 1950), Koch and Tononi’s test
essentially amounts to asking arbitrary questions about
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what is going on in any one photograph. One way of
doing so is by asking the system to distinguish
‘‘congruent’’ from ‘‘incongruent’’ images, such as an
ice-skater on a rug in the living room, a transparent
cow, or a cat chasing a dog. A system that could pass a
great variety of such tests could be considered to
possess a form of visual consciousness.
We set out here to experimentally examine this
operational test using conscious human observers.
Translated into a psychophysical experimental para-
digm, we tested the supposition that processing the
incongruency of a scene can only be done when the
image is visible and not when it is masked. Accordingly,
we deﬁne integration here as the combination of two or
more distinct features, or constituents, of the scene.
Such a combination, according to the assumption that
consciousness is needed for integration, can only be
consciously performed.
This assumption could be questioned; previous
studies have demonstrated different forms of high-level
processing in the absence of awareness (for review, see
van Gaal, De Lange, & Cohen, 2012), some of which
involve complicated integrative processes (e.g., com-
bining words into congruent and incongruent sentenc-
es, see Sklar et al., 2012). However, these have usually
used simple visual stimuli such as arrows (De Lange,
Van Gaal, Lamme, & Dehaene, 2011), numbers
(Garcı´a-Orza, Damas-Lo´pez, Matas, & Rodrı´guez,
2009; Ric & Muller, 2012; Sklar et al., 2012; Van
Opstal, de Lange, & Dehaene, 2011), or words (Reber
& Henke, 2012; Sklar et al., 2012). Only one study
presented subjects with suppressed real-life complex
scenes and directly demonstrated differential processing
between congruent and incongruent images (Mudrik,
Breska, Lamy, & Deouell, 2011), along the lines of
Koch and Tononi’s test.
This study used the technique of continuous ﬂash
suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya,
Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 2006), in which distinct colorful
patterns (‘‘Mondrians’’) are ﬂashed successively at
approximately 10 Hz into one eye, leading to a
prolonged suppression of a lower contrast and sta-
tionary image presented to the other eye. Yet despite
the long and powerful suppression, at some point the
suppressed image does gain dominance over the
Mondrian suppressor, thereby becoming visible to the
observer. This point in time can serve as a measure of
the level of unconscious processing during suppression
(Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007): When images that
systematically differ on some dimension break sup-
pression at different times, one must infer that this
difference was somehow processed and that this
differential processing is associated with differential
response times.
Therefore, Mudrik, Breska, and colleagues (2011)
measured suppression durations of congruent and
incongruent visual scenes (e.g., a woman talking over a
telephone vs. a woman ‘‘talking over’’ a shoe).
Incongruent scenes emerged into awareness about 140
ms earlier than congruent scenes. This time difference
was not found in a control condition, where the two
types of scenes were presented binocularly on top of the
Mondrians with gradually increasing contrast. As
opposed to the experimental condition, the gradual
binocular presentation does not involve a prolonged
period of complete invisibility but only a stage of
partial awareness (Kouider & Dupoux, 2004) leading to
full awareness. Hence it was concluded that integration
of the scene’s elements took place during unconscious
processing rather than partial awareness. This ﬁnding
thus challenges the notion that integrating the image of
an individual carrying out an action with an object
appropriate to the image’s background depends on
conscious perception of this image (Koch, 2011), as in
the Koch–Tononi image test.
However, these ﬁndings have been methodologically
contested: The validity of the control condition as
means to rule out partial-awareness effects has recently
been put into question (Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011).
The control and experimental conditions in CFS differ
profoundly both in observers’ subjective experience of
the stimuli and in their reaction-time distributions, with
greater variability in the experimental condition. When
these distributions were matched by mixing experi-
mental and control trials (rather than using a block
design typical of previous studies; see Jiang et al., 2007;
Mudrik, Breska, et al., 2011; Yang, Zald, & Blake,
2007), the alleged ‘‘unconscious’’ effect was found in
both the control and experimental conditions. This may
cast doubt on the interpretation that incongruency was
unconsciously processed, without any involvement of
partial awareness. Furthermore, recent experiments in
our own lab (Mudrik, Gelbard-Sagiv, Faivre, & Koch,
2013) have showed that CFS actually involves long
periods of partial awareness that are commonly not
controlled for, in which subjects can perceive some, but
not all, features of the suppressed stimulus (for another
demonstration of partial awareness of color during
CFS, see Hong & Blake, 2009). Critically, we found
that indirect measures of semantic processing (i.e.,
adaption/priming to famous and nonfamous faces)
show effects only during partial awareness and not
during complete unconscious processing, where sub-
jects have no access to any feature of the suppressed
stimulus. As such partial awareness usually goes
unnoticed in many CFS experiments, this implies that
some of the reported ‘‘unconscious’’ processing during
CFS might actually reﬂect partial-awareness effects.
These ﬁndings highlight the methodological shortcom-
ings of CFS, and especially the breaking CFS measure,
as a means to evaluate the depth of pure unconscious
processing. They therefore call for a reexamination of
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unconscious integration, especially given the discrep-
ancy between the ﬁndings of Mudrik, Breska, and
colleagues (2011) and the existing theories of con-
sciousness.
In the current study, we employed a classical
masking paradigm (for reviews, see Breitmeyer &
Ogmen, 2000, 2006; Kahneman, 1968) in order to
prevent conscious perception of congruent and incon-
gruent scenes. In masking, the visibility of one stimulus
(the prime) is reduced by a spatially overlapping
previous or subsequent stimulus (mask). Here, a target
stimulus (a scene different from the prime that also
includes a congruent or incongruent object) followed
the prime, in order to indirectly assess the level of
unconscious congruency processing: If such processing
is possible, we expected to (a) ﬁnd shorter reaction
times for trials in which prime and target belong to the
same category (i.e., priming; see, e.g., Cheesman &
Merikle, 1984; Dehaene et al., 2001; Draine & Green-
wald, 1998) and/or (b) ﬁnd prolonged reaction times
for targets following incongruent primes, as the latter
are known to slow down subjects’ performance (see,
e.g., Bar & Ullman, 1996; Biederman, 1972; Boyce &
Pollatsek, 1992).
This design allowed us to ﬁrst evaluate the validity
of Mudrik, Breska, and colleagues’ (2011) ﬁndings and
their generalizability to other paradigms. Second, it
enabled us to test the required exposure duration for
unconscious incongruency processing: While in the
earlier CFS study the images were presented at full
contrast for about 2.5 s (until their emergence into
awareness), here they were presented for 33 ms only
(and at reduced contrast). Previous studies have found
congruency processing of scenes presented for less
than 100 ms (Davenport & Potter, 2004) and as short
as 26 ms (Joubert, Fize, Rousselet, & Fabre-Thorpe,
2008), but there the scenes were highly visible. Thus,
ﬁnding evidence for incongruency processing of
masked scenes presented for a mere 33 ms would
strengthen the claim that some integration of scene
elements can indeed be performed in the absence of
conscious awareness, even at impoverished presenta-
tion conditions.
Method
Participants
Fourteen healthy volunteers (four women, 10 men;
11 right-handed, three left-handed), aged 19–31 (mean
¼ 23.3), with reportedly normal or corrected-to-normal
sight and no psychiatric or neurological history
participated in the study for payment (approximately
$15 per hour). The experiment was approved by the
Institutional Review Board committee of the California
Institute of Technology, and informed consent was
obtained after the experimental procedures were
explained to the subjects.
Stimuli
Stimuli were 144 pairs of colored real-life scenes that
depict a person performing an action with an object (a
modiﬁcation of the stimuli used in Mudrik, Deouell, &
Lamy, 2011; Mudrik, Lamy, & Deouell, 2010). In both
congruent and incongruent images, the critical object
was pasted from another image using Adobe Photo-
shop software, so that it was either congruent or
incongruent with the background (e.g., a baseball
player batting with a bat or with a ﬂower bouquet, a
woman applying a lipstick or a pickle; see Figure 1).
This procedure assures that image artifacts that might
occur during the object-insertion procedure occur for
both types of scenes. All images were correctly rated
by 24 subjects as either congruent or incongruent in a
pretest experiment (see Mudrik et al., 2010). The
pictures’ luminance and contrast levels were digitally
equated using the Adobe Photoshop software, and
low-level differences in saliency, chromaticity, and
spatial frequency were tested using an objective
perceptual model (Neumann & Gegenfurtner, 2006).
No such differences were found (for details, see again
Mudrik et al., 2010), implying that at the group level,
the scenes differ in the semantic congruency of the
object with its background rather than in the low-level
features tested here. Seventy-two of the pairs served as
primes and 72 served as targets, so there was no
repetition between primes and targets throughout the
experiment. Masks were made by dividing the images
into a 5·6 matrix and then randomly shufﬂing the
cells (see Figure 1 for examples). Since in the
calibration and visibility posttest conditions the task
pertained to primes’ direction, half the primes and half
the masks were presented upside down, and half
upright.
Apparatus
Subjects sat in a dimly lit room. The stimuli were
presented on a 19-in. CRT monitor with a 60-Hz
refresh rate and 1024·768 resolution, using Matlab
and Psychtoolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). They
appeared on a gray background at the center of the
computer screen and subtended 6.518 (width) · 9.078
(height) of visual angle. Participants’ heads were
stabilized using a chin rest located 57 cm from the
screen.
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Procedure
The experiment included three conditions: calibra-
tion, masking, and visibility posttest. In all conditions,
the same stimulus sequence was presented: First, two
forward masks were presented for 50 ms each,
followed by 17-ms blanks (aimed at prolonging
stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA] and accordingly
enhancing priming; see Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke,
Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003). Then the prime was
presented for 33 ms, followed by a blank (17 ms) and
three backward masks (50-ms and 17-ms blanks;
Figure 1. (a) Experimental paradigm and stimuli: Two forward masks preceded a congruent or incongruent prime, which was then
followed by three backward masks. To achieve maximum masking of the prime scene, the first backward mask was introduced
together with six colorful squares that overlapped its edges and extended outside its boundaries. The prime appeared for 33 ms, each
mask lasted 50 ms, and all stimuli were followed by a 17-ms blank. This sequence was repeated three times and followed by a target
that appeared for another 33 ms and a 17-ms blank. Then questions appeared; in the experimental condition, subjects first had to
classify the target as weird or normal, then rate prime visibility on a scale of 1 to 4, and finally classify the prime as weird or normal.
In the visibility posttest condition, subjects first classified the prime and then rated its visibility. On the right are enlarged examples of
the congruent and incongruent versions of the prime (baseball player batting either with a bat or with a flower bouquet), and target
(woman applying lipstick or a pickle). (b) More examples of the congruent and incongruent scenes. From left to right: a girl drinking
either from a football or from a water bottle, a boy playing with a drum or with a ball in the water, a man shaving either with a fork or
with a razor, a man holding either an eggplant or a flashlight.
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sandwich masking). To strengthen masking power, the
ﬁrst backward mask was accompanied by six color
squares (two blue, two green, and two red), overlap-
ping its borders and extending outwards (Figure 1).
This entire sequence was presented three times
(Macknik & Livingstone, 1998) and was then followed
by a target that appeared at 0.5 contrast (deﬁned by
image’s transparency, using Matlab’s alpha function)
for 33 ms in order to make it difﬁcult to identify and
possibly facilitate priming, followed by a blank (17
ms). The target was not masked; thus, it was always
visible, although subjects did not always manage to
fully grasp its content. After the last 17-ms blank, a
series of questions was presented, which varied with
condition (see following).
The calibration condition included 72 trials in
which half the prime images—congruent and incon-
gruent—were upright and half were inverted (psue-
dorandomly intermixed, with the constraint that the
same prime orientation was never presented in four
consecutive trials). Subjects’ task was to report the
orientation of the prime image while ignoring the
target, using the up and down arrow keys, and then to
subjectively rate its visibility on the Perceptual
Awareness Scale (Ramsy & Overgaard, 2004), where 1
signiﬁes ‘‘I didn’t see anything,’’ 2 stands for ‘‘I had a
vague perception of something,’’ 3 represents ‘‘I saw a
clear part of the image,’’ and 4 is ‘‘I saw the entire
image clearly.’’ In case subjects did not manage to see
the prime, they were instructed to guess. To prevent
any exposure to the scenes that would be presented as
primes in the experimental condition, all images
(primes and targets) in the calibration condition were
taken from the target-stimuli bank, so they were never
presented as primes throughout the experiment.
Using a staircase procedure (Levitt, 1971), prime
and masks contrast were determined for each subject,
so as to reach the highest contrast of the prime for
which subjects were still at chance performance: Initial
masks contrast was 0.85, and initial prime contrast
was 0.7. Following correct responses (i.e., correct
classiﬁcation of the image direction as upright or
inverted), masks contrast was ramped up by 0.05, and
following incorrect responses, it was ramped down by
0.05. If masks contrast reached 1, prime contrast was
reduced using the same criterion and the same
contrast units (0.05), with a low boundary of 0.4.
When subjects completed the calibration, masks
contrast was set to the second highest level reached
throughout the session—or, if masks contrasts
reached 1, it was set to 1—and prime contrast was set
to the second lowest level reached throughout the
session. Across subjects, averaged masks contrast was
0.94 (SD¼ 0.08) and averaged prime contrast was 0.62
(SD ¼ 0.08).
The main experimental condition included 144 trials.
Here, all primes were upright and included either a
congruent or an incongruent object (primes’ congru-
ency was intermixed with the same constraint).
Subjects’ task was ﬁrst to report the target’s congru-
ency as fast as they could, by pressing either the right or
the left arrow key (Q1; see Figure 1; key assignment
was randomized between subjects), then to subjectively
rate the prime’s visibility by pressing the 1 through 4
keys (Q2), and ﬁnally to report the prime’s congruency
using the same keys (objective measure; Q3). Subjects
were again instructed to guess if they did not know the
answer to either the ﬁrst or the third question. Every
prime image in a pair appeared once, so that
throughout the experiment, subjects were exposed to
both the congruent and the incongruent versions of
each scene exactly once. To counterbalance the order of
presentation, the session was divided into two halves,
so that within each half, 50% of the images were
congruent and 50% incongruent, with no pair repeti-
tion. In the second half, every image that appeared as
congruent in the ﬁrst half appeared now as incongru-
ent, and vice versa. Image order within each half was
randomized, so subjects could not form any expecta-
tion about the order of the images in the second half
following the ﬁrst.
Finally, the visibility posttest was aimed at achiev-
ing a better assessment of stimulus visibility during the
main experimental condition. In the latter, the
objective measure pertained to the same dimension
that was being indirectly measured for the target
(scene congruency), to avoid a mismatch between
prime and target response (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006).
Yet such a high-level objective measure might not be
sensitive enough to lower level awareness of some
other aspects of the stimulus that might drive the
reported effect (Kouider & Dupoux, 2004; Mudrik et
al., 2013). For example, subjects may not be able to
perceive enough of the image to report its congruency
(leading to chance performance in the objective
measure) but still see enough to report a lower level
feature, like direction (upright or inverted) or the
person’s gender. Thus in the visibility posttest, we
again presented the same primes that were used in the
main experimental condition, but with half upright
and half inverted, and asked subjects to report image
orientation and visibility. Note that the objective
measure in this condition is much stricter than in the
main experimental one, as (a) a lower level feature is
tested; (b) the critical question appears just following
the experimental sequence rather than after two other
questions, excluding the possibility that subjects knew
the answer but were unable to keep it in memory; and
(c) subjects were already well trained with the image
and the experimental procedure, so their chances to
perform better were higher.
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Results
Overall target and prime classification
Subjects could classify the brieﬂy ﬂashed targets as
congruent or incongruent, but only poorly (Q1, see
again Figure 1; M ¼ 58%, SD¼ 4%; t(13) ¼ 7.35, p ,
0.001; mean d0 ¼ 0.46, SD¼ 0.24; t(13) ¼ 7.23, p ,
0.001), while they failed to correctly classify the masked
primes (Q2; M¼ 50%, SD¼ 6%, t(13)¼ 0.02, p¼ 0.98;
mean d0 ¼ 0.02, SD¼ 0.30; t(13) ¼ 0.27, p ¼ 0.79).
Subjects’ poor performance for targets can probably be
explained by the very short presentation duration (33
ms) and the reduced contrast (0.5). This suggestion is
supported by the apparent difference in classifying
congruent and incongruent targets: Subjects seemed to
be better at classifying the former (M¼ 68%, SD¼ 7%)
than the latter (M ¼ 49%, SD¼ 6%; t(13) ¼ 7.46; p ,
0.00001 for the difference between congruent and
incongruent targets), though no difference in response
time (RT) was found (M ¼ 1.81 s, SD¼ 0.58 for
congruent scenes; M ¼ 1.83 s, SD¼ 0.66 for
incongruent scenes; t(13) ¼ 0.59, p¼ 0.57). However,
this seeming advantage for congruent targets can be
explained by subjects’ response bias to classify targets
as congruent (mean lnb¼ 0.12, SD¼ 0.08; t(13)¼ 5.44,
p , 0.001) when they were unable to identify any
‘‘weird’’ object in the image. Since targets were brieﬂy
ﬂashed, subjects often failed to detect such an object,
leading to a more frequent classiﬁcation of the target as
congruent.
Prime visibility
Subjective measure
Subjects’ visibility ratings (Q2; Figure 1) conﬁrmed
that the masking procedure for the prime was effective:
Seventy-four percent of the trials were rated as ‘‘I saw
nothing’’ (1), 20% as ‘‘I had a vague perception of
something’’ (2), and only 6% as either ‘‘I saw a clear
part of the image’’ (3) or ‘‘I saw the entire image
clearly’’ (4; Figure 2). Visibility ratings for congruent
(75%, 19%, 1%, and 5% for visibility ratings of 1
through 4, respectively) and incongruent (73%, 20%,
1%, and 5%) primes did not differ, as revealed by the
lack of interaction in a two-way ANOVA analysis
between Congruency (congruent/incongruent) and
Visibility rating (saw nothing/vague perception/saw
clear part/saw entire image), F(3,39)¼ 1.43, p¼ 0.249.
No individual image was consistently seen or never seen
across all subjects. In all the following analyses, we only
report on the 74% of trials in which the prime was not
seen at all.
Objective measure (visibility posttest)
Although subjects were completely at chance in
reporting primes’ congruency (see overall prime per-
formance previously), the visibility posttest showed
that they were signiﬁcantly above chance for judging
the orientation of the masked primes (M¼ 62%, SD¼
7%; t(13)¼ 6.52, p , 0.0001; mean d0¼ 0.62, SD¼ 0.14,
t(13)¼ 6.59, p , 0.0001). No difference in performance
was found between congruent and incongruent primes
(M¼ 63%, SD¼ 13% for congruent primes; M¼ 61%,
SD¼ 14% for incongruent primes; t(13) ¼ 0.32, p¼
0.76). Importantly, however, subjects’ subjective rat-
ings also seem to have changed between the experi-
mental condition and the visibility posttest condition:
In the latter, only 51% of the trials were classiﬁed as
‘‘saw nothing,’’ 32% as ‘‘vague perception,’’ and 17% as
either ‘‘saw clear part’’ or ‘‘saw entire image.’’ Indeed, a
two-way ANOVA with Condition (experimental/visi-
bility posttest) and Visibility rating (saw nothing/vague
perception/saw clear part/saw entire image) showed a
main effect for Visibility rating, F(3,39)¼ 19.03, p ,
0.0001, and critically also an interaction between
Condition and Visibility rating, F(3,39) ¼ 5.15, p ,
0.005, so that subjects’ ratings were different in the
visibility posttest as compared with the experimental
condition.
Since the stimulus sequence was identical between
the two conditions, this difference could have stemmed
from the different tasks, that might have evoked
different classiﬁcation criteria, from the different
attentional demands (since in the posttest subjects did
not have to attend to the target), or from subjects’
higher resilience to the masking due to a generalized
training effect (as each image was only used once as a
prime). Thus, we computed subjects’ accuracy for
prime direction using only the 51% of ‘‘Saw nothing’’
trials. There, prime accuracy dropped to chance, as
revealed by a one-sampled t test against 0.5 (M¼ 53%,
SD¼ 11%; t(13)¼ 0.91, p¼ 0.38; mean d0 ¼ 0.04, SD¼
0.24, t(13) ¼ 0.72, p ¼ 0.48).
Reaction times
Subjects’ RTs for the target (Q1; correct trials only)
were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA. Trials with a
reaction time outside of three standard deviations were
excluded. In order to conduct the ANOVA analysis on
the RTs, we ﬁrst tested whether they are normally
distributed. A Shapiro–Wilk normality test conducted
on the combined distribution of congruent and
incongruent trials showed that the distribution violates
the normality assumption (W ¼ 0.90, p , 0.05). Thus,
we ran a logarithmic transformation on all the RT
values to obtain a normal distribution (W ¼ 0.95, p ¼
0.19). All subsequent RT analyses were conducted on
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the logarithmic distribution. In the following, we label
all cases in which both prime and target were either
both congruent or both incongruent as ‘‘same,’’ and
cases in which these two differ as ‘‘different.’’
ANOVA (Figure 3) was run with Repetition (same/
different) and Prime congruency (congruent/incongru-
ent) as regressors. This revealed a main effect for
congruency, F(1,13)¼ 33.91, p , 0.0001, showing that
RTs for targets following an incongruent prime are
longer (M¼ 1.84 s, SD¼ 0.64 for same;M¼ 1.90 s, SD
¼ 0.65 for different; nonlogarithmic values) than
following a congruent prime (M¼ 1.73 s, SD¼ 0.56;M
¼ 1.73 s, SD¼ 0.52)—irrespective of prime–target
relations (hence also irrespective of the target’s
congruency). At the individual-subjects level, 11 out of
14 subjects showed the effect (binomial test, p¼ 0.006;
Figure 4). We did not ﬁnd either a main effect for
repetition or an interaction between repetition and
congruency. Notably, prolonged RTs following incon-
gruent primes were found also when using the raw,
nonlogarithmic data, F(1,13) ¼ 16.96, p , 0.002.
Arguably, the congruency effect we found might
have stemmed from subjects’ familiarity with the scenes
in the second half of the experiment: Since every scene
that appeared as congruent in the ﬁrst half appeared as
incongruent in the second half, and vice versa, subjects
could have formed expectations about scenes’ congru-
ency in the second half. If that was indeed the case, one
could have expected to ﬁnd (a) better performance for
primes or (b) stronger RT effects in the second half of
the experiment. Accordingly, we divided the trials into
two halves and examined prime performance and the
RT effect in both. No evidence for this possible
confound were found; prime performance was at
Figure 2. Subjects’ visibility ratings for the prime in the experimental conditions (Q2 in Figure 1). Note that about 94% of the trials
were rated as either ‘‘I saw nothing’’ or ‘‘I had a only vague perception of something.’’ All analyses of the main experiment were
carried out on the nonperceived trials that were classified as ‘‘see nothing.’’
Figure 3. A table with mean values of positive and negative standard deviation for both reaction times (left) and accuracy of the
subjects in answering Q1 (‘‘target weird’’; right) in the four conditions, and p values of statistical comparisons based on the ANOVA
analysis (blue; vertical arrows depict a main effect, diagonal arrows an interaction) and subsequent post hoc contrasts (red arrows).
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chance for both halves (M ¼ 52%, SD¼ 9% for the
second half; t(13)¼ 0.75, p¼ 0.466;M¼ 48%, SD¼ 7%
for the second half; t(13) ¼ 0.78, p ¼ 0.450). The
congruency main effect was in fact only found for the
ﬁrst half, implying that when subjects saw the scenes
for the second time—albeit with other objects—they
were less affected by their incongruency (F(1,13)¼
15.25, p¼ 0.002, and F(1,13)¼ 2.13, p¼ 0.168). Given
the low number of trials in each cell in this analysis (18
or less), we cannot determine if this null result reﬂects
lack of effect or a too-low signal-to-noise ratio.
Accuracy
A two-way ANOVA (Figure 3) run on the accuracy
of Q1 (‘‘target weird’’) with Repetition (same different)
and Prime congruency (congruent/incongruent) as
regressors revealed an interaction between repetition
and congruency, F(1,13) ¼ 40.58, p , 0.0001, and no
main effects. Yet post hoc contrasts showed that this
interaction stems from targets’ congruency rather than
primes’: No difference in accuracy was found between
congruent and incongruent primes when the target was
either congruent, t(13)¼ 0.18, p¼ 0.86, or incongruent,
t(13) ¼ 0.26, p ¼ 0.80. On the contrary, in the ‘‘same’’
trials, accuracy for congruent primes (hence, congruent
targets; M ¼ 66%, SD ¼ 11%) was higher than for
incongruent primes (hence, incongruent targets; M ¼
48%, SD ¼ 12%; t(13) ¼ 4.55, p , 0.001). Similarly, in
the ‘‘different’’ trials, accuracy for congruent primes
(hence, incongruent targets; M ¼ 49%, SD¼ 7%) was
lower than for incongruent primes (hence, congruent
targets; M¼ 67%, SD¼ 12%; t(13)¼ 4.51, p , 0.001).
Averaged across all trials, subjects correctly answered
Q1 about two thirds of the time (M¼ 66%, SD¼ 7%; p
, 0.0001) when the target was congruent but were at
chance (M¼ 49%, SD¼ 6%; p¼ 0.54) when the target
was incongruent. This may reﬂect subjects’ bias to
classify targets as congruent, leading to high accuracy
for congruent targets and low accuracy for incongruent
targets. To overcome this bias and look for potential
accuracy difference irrespective of targets’ congruency,
we calculated d0 in ‘‘same’’ (mean d0 ¼ 0.38, SD¼ 0.47)
and ‘‘different’’ trials (mean d0 ¼ 0.44, SD¼ 0.44). Still,
no difference was found, t(13) ¼ 0.44, p ¼ 0.67.
Discussion
Our ﬁndings show that processing of images that
were preceded by invisible images depicting a person
performing an appropriate action (e.g., batting at a ball
with a baseball bat) is on average 100 ms (SD¼ 13 ms)
faster than processing of images that were preceded by
invisible images depicting an inappropriate action (e.g.,
using a ﬂower bouquet to bat a ball). The images were
Figure 4. RTs for targets with congruent and incongruent primes, for individual subjects, and for invisible trials only. Each purple circle
is a subject, with gray lines representing standard errors for that subject. Circles above the diagonal represent longer RTs following an
incongruent prime, below the diagonal represent longer RTs following a congruent prime, and on the diagonal represent equal RTs
following both types of primes.
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rendered invisible by short exposure, low contrast, and
sandwich masking. Using both subjective and objective
measures assured us that subjects were indeed unaware
of the masked primes. Notably, our objective test not
only controlled for awareness of primes’ congruency
but also ruled out the option of lower level awareness
of more basic prime features such as orientation of the
image (upside down or not). The results are not likely
to be explained by some systematic low-level difference
between congruent and incongruent primes, as these
were strictly controlled for (contrast, visual saliency,
chromaticity, spatial frequency; see Method).
The RT difference we found is the ﬁrst demonstra-
tion of ongoing contextual inﬂuences of unseen stimuli
on subsequent targets. These contextual relations were
unconsciously processed here in stimuli of reduced
contrast and a very short stimulus exposure (33 ms).
Thus, our ﬁndings go beyond those of Mudrik, Breska,
and colleagues (2011) by, ﬁrst, overcoming their
methodological limitations and, second, extending their
ﬁndings to show subsequent inﬂuence on performance
under highly impoverished presentation conditions, in
a completely different paradigm. Our ﬁndings can
further be taken as strengthening previous ﬁndings of
high-level integrative processes in the absence of
awareness (Garcı´a-Orza et al., 2009; Reber & Henke,
2012; Ric & Muller, 2012; Sklar et al., 2012; Van Opstal
et al., 2011).
Integration in the absence of awareness
Our ﬁndings show that some integration can, indeed,
take place during unconscious processing. The exact
nature of this process remains open. One possibility is
that our results demonstrate high-level scene integra-
tion and comprehension, where the semantic relations
between the object and its background are processed
(see, e.g., Boly et al., 2013; Bor & Seth, 2012; Lau &
Rosenthal, 2011). An alternative interpretation is that
the unconscious processing reﬂects object-to-object
associations, formed by the coactivation of groups of
object-selective neurons (see, e.g., Keysers, Xiao,
Fo¨ldia´k, & Perrett, 2001; Li & DiCarlo, 2008; Quian-
Quiroga, Fried, & Koch, 2013): Upon scene presenta-
tion, such neurons encode the different objects that
appear in the scene in parallel. In previous exposures to
similar scenes where congruent objects tended to
appear jointly, populations of object-selective neurons
would have already ﬁred together, reinforcing their
interconnections and facilitating the processing of
congruent scenes. On the contrary, in incongruent
scenes the coactivation of selective neurons that rarely
ﬁre simultaneously gives rise to conﬂicts which in turn
can lead to delayed visual processing of that scene
(Fabre-Thorpe, 2011; note, however, that in our study
incongruent scenes hindered the processing of subse-
quent stimuli, and that in about a third of our images,
the incongruency of the object could not have been
inferred from its relations with other objects in the
scene but only from the way it was held by the person
performing the action). Both interpretations, however,
imply the occurrence of integration processes: In order
for the described conﬂicts to arise, an interaction
between the object-selective neurons should occur.
If so, how can our ﬁndings be reconciled with the
common assumption that consciousness involves inte-
gration of information (see, e.g., Baars, 2005; Dehaene
& Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2006; Lamme & Roelfse-
ma, 2000; Tononi & Edelman, 1998; Tononi & Koch,
2008)?
It may be that the claim that consciousness of an
image is necessary for any type of object integration to
occur needs to be revised. When denied the option of
conscious processing, observers seem to nevertheless be
able to process the likelihood of an object’s appearing
in a speciﬁc scene. Whether this is achieved via high-
level visual-scene integration or through object-to-
object integration, it challenges the claim that con-
sciousness is necessary for integrative processes to
occur. However, this challenge does not imply that
when a viewer is able to consciously perceive a scene,
integration is still performed by unconscious processes
(much like one can move in space without legs,
although we would not want to claim that the function
of legs is not enabling movement in space; Koch, 2012;
Lau, 2009). Rather, consciousness may regularly
operate as a key facilitator of integration, which in turn
can occur also during unconscious processing—at least
to some extent.
Notably, our ﬁndings do not show that the
integrative processes of incongruent scenes were indeed
completed without awareness (note that no evidence for
congruency priming was found, as discussed later);
impaired performance following incongruent scenes
could have stemmed from the failure to unconsciously
integrate them. Arguably, when integration involves
previously learned associations, acquired during past
conscious experiences, it can be unconsciously per-
formed (Dehaene et al., 2001; Dehaene & Changeux,
2011). Yet when the scene involves objects that were
not previously integrated during conscious perception
(i.e., incongruent scenes), integration fails. This failure
may subsequently lead to the allocation of additional
attentional resources and may thereby hinder subse-
quent performance (see further discussion later).
Contextual engagement of attention
The prolonged RTs for targets following incongru-
ent primes are in line with a large literature showing
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poorer performance for incongruent than congruent
stimuli (see, e.g., Bar & Ullman, 1996; Biederman,
Glass, & Stacy, 1973; Chun & Jiang, 1998; Kosslyn,
1994; Palmer, 1975; Underwood, 2005). Yet these
studies have typically focused on the processing of the
congruent or incongruent stimulus itself and explained
the performance decline by this stimulus’s being harder
to process or comprehend.
Here we show that the processing of not only the
actual incongruent stimulus is hindered but also that of
a subsequent stimulus presented about 200 ms later. As
we suggested earlier, a possible mechanism might be
attentional engagement by the incongruent stimulus.
Support for this interpretation can be drawn from the
results of a binocular-rivalry (BR) study (Mudrik,
Deouell, et al., 2011), in which congruent and
incongruent objects embedded in the same scenes
rivaled against each other. Through differentiating
between length and number of dominance periods of
the congruent and incongruent objects, that study
showed that while attention is not captured by
incongruent objects (i.e., the number of incongruent
dominance periods was not higher than that of
congruent ones), it is nevertheless engaged by it (i.e.,
once an incongruent object became dominant, it
remained so for longer periods; see also De Graef,
Christiaens, & Dydewalle, 1990; Underwood, Temple-
man, Lamming, & Foulsham, 2008).
An important difference between the current study
and the BR one is that here attention seems to have
been engaged by incongruent stimuli while they were
unconsciously perceived, rather than after they gained
dominance during rivalry. Taken together with previ-
ous reports of attentional engagement or shifts in the
absence of awareness (Ansorge & Heumann, 2006;
Jiang, Costello, Fang, Huang, & He, 2006; McCor-
mick, 1997), this can lend support for the notion that
attention and consciousness are two distinct processes
that sometimes operate independently from one an-
other (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, &
Sergent, 2006; Hardcastle, 1997; Koch, 2004; Koch &
Tsuchiya, 2007; Lamme, 2003; van Boxtel, Tsuchiya, &
Koch, 2009).
Lack of congruency priming and accuracy effects
In this study we failed to ﬁnd any evidence for
congruency priming: No RT or accuracy differences
were found between trials in which prime and target
were of the same category (congruent or incongruent)
and trials in which they were of different categories.
Two possible explanations could account for this lack
of evidence. First, the relatively long SOA between
target and prime (200 ms) might have not allowed for
priming, which is a short-lived, rapidly decaying
phenomenon (Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996;
Mattler, 2005), especially for high-level processes.
Alternatively, this could be taken as evidence that
unconscious integration is only partial as compared
with conscious integration; incongruency may lead to
impaired performance on a future target, even without
establishing an actual labeling of congruency or
incongruency. By this account, the prolonged RTs we
found only reﬂect the failure to form a representation
for the incongruent object, which impeded subsequent
performance. Future studies using shorter SOAs and
examining conscious priming of congruency could shed
more light on this issue.
Furthermore, the effect of incongruent primes on
subsequent processing was only reﬂected in response
latency, not in accuracy. This could be explained in two
ways. On a more general level, RT measures are
considered more sensitive than accuracy ones (see, e.g.,
Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 2000; Scherag, De-
muth, Ro¨sler, Neville, & Ro¨der, 2004) though for some
purposes, like differentiating between healthy and
brain-damaged populations, accuracy may be more
informative (see, e.g., Swick & Jovanovic, 2002), which
accordingly could lead to an effect being found only in
the latter measure. Speciﬁc to our data, the accuracy
measure was probably rendered even less sensitive
given subjects’ overall poor performance and their
relatively strong response bias to classify the targets as
congruent. We suggest that subjects tended to classify
targets as incongruent only when they managed to
detect an incongruent object. Since the targets were
brieﬂy ﬂashed, in many trials subjects were unable to
do so, leading to a much higher rate of ‘‘congruent’’
responses. This probably overcame any unconscious
inﬂuence of the primes.
Conclusions
Our ﬁndings provide support for the notion that at
least some integration of the constituents of real-life,
rich and detailed scenes can occur in the absence of
conscious awareness of these scenes. This integration
was shown to inﬂuence future processing of a
subsequent image, possibly due to attentional engage-
ment by incongruent scenes. This study further
demonstrates that such unconscious processing can be
obtained even when the critical stimulus is presented
brieﬂy, with reduced contrast. This suggests that while
consciousness might indeed be highly involved in
information integration, it may not be necessary for all
such integration to occur.
Keywords: consciousness, integration, incongruency,
object–background relations, masking, scene perception,
real-life visual scenes
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